''Sometimes,'' he said, ''I feel like I'd like to wring somebody's neck.''

by OLGS, guest blogger

''Sometimes,'' he said, ''I feel like I'd like to wring somebody's neck.''

--Former Secretary of State George P. Schultz, testifying before the Joint House-Senate Iran-Contra Committee, July 25, 1987

Twenty-one years ago, I remember staying at home during the summer taking care of then pre-schooler Joe College Graduate, and the still-in-diapers Joe College. In between feedings, walks with the stroller, and diaper-changes, I spent my days watching the Congress hold hearings to investigate the secret White House- led covert operations in Iran, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Perhaps the only witness appearing under oath who emerged with any of his or her reputation undamaged was Secretary of State George Schultz, shown above on the Stanford campus. The secretary testified that the White House and the National Security Council had kept secret from him and his State Department the sale of weapons to Iran and the transfer of funds and weapons to the Contras in Nicaragua, both actions in violation of U.S. law. Schultz’s feeling that he wanted to “wring somebody’s neck” was directed mainly at the President’s staff, who served their president badly, he testified.

It's summer again, and today's headlines reminded me of the summer of 1987 and Iran-Contra. Yesterday, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued two reports. The first one, known as Report “Phase IIa,” recounted what had long been reported in the press: from August 2002 through February 2003, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Powell made statements about Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction based on shaded, exaggerated, or sometimes on no intelligence at all. Here’s the link to the summary of the Phase IIa report:

http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298775

The full report is also available from the Committee as a pdf file and is well-worth reading.

Almost overlooked was the second report, which brought Schultz’s 1987 comment about the White House and National Security Council to mind. The “Phase IIb” report made public that starting in 2001 and continuing through 2003, the National Security Council’s deputy director (Stephen Hadley) and the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Paul Wolfowitz), and the Office of the Vice President (Dick Cheney) approved a covert operation meant to lead to “regime change” in Iran. Who was the essential middleman to put the U.S. in touch with so-called “Iranian moderates”? None other than one of the arms dealers in the Iran-Contra affair, Manucher Ghobanifar, shown here in1987.

Just as Robert “Bud” McFarlane, Admiral John Poindexter, and Colonel Oliver “Ollie” North, kept the State Department in the dark about their dealings in Iran and Nicaragua, so, too, did the Bush Administration’s wannabe-spooks led by Hadley, Wolfowitz, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, and also Elliot Abrams (another Iran-Contra figure) keep Secretary of State Colin Powell and CIA Director George Tenet uninformed about the 2001-2003 Ghobanifar-inspired attempt at regime change in Iran. As much as $25 million dollars was funneled through Ghobanifar between 2001 and 2003 to promote “regime change” in Iran. The Phase IIb report also suggests that the Ghobanifar initiative was manipulated by Iranian intelligence to send false information directly to the White House. This reads like a reprise of the Iran-Contra affair.

One of the regrettable outcomes of the Iran-Contra investigations is how few Reagan Administration people were indicted and sent to jail. One of the regrettable results of that failure is how many have surfaced with responsible jobs in the Bush 43 Administration. Is it too much to ask the Senate Intelligence Committee to refer to the Justice Department for prosecution everyone involved with this second Iran-Contra scandal? Is it too much to ask to send Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Hadley, Elliot Abrams and others to jail before they can start work on a third covert operation to effect “regime change” in Iran through Ghobanifar’s “Iranian moderates”?